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ABSTRACT 
The literature of the past 30 years is liberally sprinkled with cOl)tributions dedi· 
cated to the improvement of corporate efficiency; one of the key areas to have been 
addressed is that of costs. which has focused attention on. inter alia. the costs of in-
ventory. Frequently it appears that the development of a logistical system which can 
eliminate or significantly reduce inventory is not only assumed to be universally 
practicable but ipso facto desirable. However, in much the same way as many com-
panies appear not to appreciate the corporate implications 0/ a marketing orienta-
tion, so also Just·ln-Time (lIT) seems commonly to be regarded as a concept or as a 
practice which only has relevance to limited areas 0/ a company's business. 
In this article, the authors endeavour to create awareness of two key areas: the 
essential prerequisites for the implementation oj a lIT programme. and the conse-
quences that flow from such a decision. The "internal' cost saving potential is 
discussed, and this is complemented by consideration of some of the potential ef-
fects on the product range and the ways in which the marketing mix may be affected. 
Recent experiences in the development of logistical bases in the United Kingdom and 
in the Federal Republic of Germany are discussed, in parallel with current practices 
in Japan. 
The authors do not pretend to have formulated a definitive scenario. but offer 
their thoughts as a basis for deliberation by managers in the belief that the decision 
to implement a lIT programme should be subservient to the corporate strategic plan 
rather than to dominate the planning process. 
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1. THE BASIS OF THE JIT CONCEPT 
Just-In-Time (J IT) is an idea commonly attributed to the Japanese but with 
acknowledged American parentage. II has often been asserted that JlT has helped to 
give industry in Japan a distinct edge in the competitive world market place (II . Pro-
tagonists claim that the effective adoption of JIT by manufacturers could lead to 
changes in indust rial practices which are supposed to be necessary in order to keep 
(or to reach) sufficient competitiveness, and which arc frequently regarded as 
representing a novel approach to industrial practice . 
The idea of the JIT concept is far fr om being revolutionary . The essential 
elements are 
- goods should be bought or produced in exactly the quantities which are needed 
- goods should be delivered to where they are needed precisely when they are 
needed 
Following these principles. companies have succeeded in reaching the goal of a 
major or total elimination of waste . Since one cannot determine 'exactly what is 
needed' unless there is a consistent quality, the goal thus encompasses the concept of 
first-time qualit y and zero dcfel:ts. 
In this sense the JIT concept is more than the creation of accountants, supposedly 
aimed at reducing working capital by way of lower inventory costs. In fact. belter 
adjustment of production and distribution to the market requirements has an impact 
on much more than quantity: an improvement in production Oexibility with short 
throughput times and the development of rationalization potential contributes to 
this harmonil3t ion. This necessit ates an optimi1.ation of the relationship of capital 
tied up between liquid assets and capital asse ts ... J IT is essentially a philosophy" 
John Mortimer (2) stresses, "of total pride in making the business lean. more simpil: 
and effective to operate. and with a higher degree of integration between the several 
stages of indust rial production and sales activities". Basica lly, JlT is a concept to 
produce and distribute goods more effectively by introducing a new perspective of 
inter·company relationships along the entire supply network . 
Impressive results have been reported as a consequence of implementing JIT-
oriented st ructures 
- Suzuki (3), Senior Manager of Mazda Motor Corporation, reports the figures 
given in Table 1 for Toyo Kogyo. 
- Wildemann [4J. an outstanding experienced gfT~protagoni st in West Germany, 
presents the follow ing data 
- improvement of production lead-time by 6O-800J'o 
- reduction of stoc ks by 50070 
- reduction of costs caused by stock keeping and transportat ion by 2011!0 
- improvement of the quality level close to °zero fault productio n' 
- improvement of overall productivity by 25 070 
- As a third information source of JIT effects we can refer to Jewitt [5} who in· 
vestigated results of JlT implemc:ntatio n programmes in the U.K. 
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TABLE I. Productivity figures in terms of production volume per employee 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Annual 
production 642 614 716672 800 003 850 155 1034 155 I 194 576 
Index 100 111.5 124.5 132.2 160.9 185.9 
Product ion 
volume per 
employee 19.3 2) . 1 25 .8 30.0 37.4 43 .8 
Index 100 119.7 133.7 155 .4 193.8 226.9 
, 
-----... 
----..... 
.--_. 
~JJJ..... 
.. --... ---. 
19 /6 
AI>' 0<::1 
19 /8 
Ap. l~ I 
Fig. I. Reduction of company·wide in-process floats (Toyo Kogyo) . 
- 90010 reduction in inventory 
- 15-40070 reduction in cost of sales 
- 90% reduction in production lead time 
- 10-30% reduction in labour 
- 75070 or more reduction in set-up 
- 50CJto reduction in manufacturing space requirements 
- 75-900/0 improvement in quality 
Even if these figures are only partly valid and somewhat generalized, the tendency 
seems obvious. In broad terms, the core of the JlT concept is the elimination of 
waste in all forms-production. materials. labour. time. energy. money and so on. 
Emphasis in the literature has been almost entirely focused on the benefits to the 
organizational customer, with lillie overt consideration of consequences for the sup· 
plier or for the ultimate customer. Perhaps competition is seen as an external 
stimulus to internal efficiency improvements: nevertheless it remains a matter for 
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speculation as to whether adoption of a JlT philosophy results in improved service 
for ultimate customers, and furthermore whether such improved short term offer· 
ings result in long term benefits or conversely result in barriers to flexibility. 
In setting the historical context for this discussion, it should perhaps be pointed 
out that (despite its recent fashionability) the lIT concept is far from new. It seems 
probable that in informal ways, JIT has been practised for generations. Two 
disparate examples may be cited. 
- The road building industry has long adopted the practice of receiving deliveries of 
surfacing materials from suppliers on site just when needed. It has been com· 
monplace for orders to be placed, stipulating the product specification, tOlal 
quantity, delivery point, date and time, so that contractors are not kept waiting 
for supplies and at the same time inventories are not accumulated on site (even if 
this were technically feasible). The onus has thus been accepted by the supplier 
that he must be prepared to handle orders at short notice loften only a few 
hours); he must thus be prepared to make rapid adjustments in his production 
rates, and thus to carry inventories in turn, or to implement J IT programmes with 
his suppliers. 
- The farming industry has, almost from time immemorial, practised what may be 
regarded as a primitive J IT philosophy . Before the advent of cold storage or 
other preserving facilities, farmers would endeavour to send to market each day 
only those Quantities of merchandise which they felt they could sell at acceptable 
prices . Timing of availability in both long and short terms became critical to 
economic advantage. 
These two ex.amples may well not be unique: they do, however, ex.hibit a distinct 
similarity to more modern or conventional examples although perhaps at different 
points in the distribution channel. All are concerned with the elimination (at least at 
one point) of inventories, and thus with the acquisition of cost advantages and 
operational simplicity. It is nevertheless evident that for such advantages to be gained 
entails organization changes and disciplines of major magnitude-especially if the 
result is to show a sustainable benefit or competitive advantage in the end market 
place . 
2. THE ELEMENTS OF THE JIT CONCEPT 
To avoid all kinds of waste mentioned above, J IT encourages a tOlal view of com· 
panies' operations and all the fa ctors innuencing 
- the management of total throughput time 
- the ability to produce quality products without any fault s 
- the maximization of resource productivity 
With respect to the complexity of the JlT concept Wildemann {4] structures the 
fields of activities to realize it (see Fig. 2). The single units are 
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Fig. 2. Elements or JIT production and procurement. 
- Integrated data processing for purposes of R&D, procurement, production plan-
ning, inventory control. marketing, meaning integrated and dialogue-oriented 
programs which provide reliable and complete data. This needs an extensive for-
malization of data collecting and data input and requires the ability to process 
large quantities of data daily, or mOTe frequently. The routine processing of large 
amounts of data can be handled by introducing an action-oriented data process-
ing system that is designed according to permanent decision necessities. In short, 
integrated data processing systems may normally be seen as the key elements and 
essential preconditions for managing the planning and coordination of activities 
within the logistical chain. 
- Manufacturing segmentation. Extensive linking of segmentation manufacturing 
capacities; the capacity cross-sections have to be synchronized with respect to 
their outpUL This should make it possible to avoid non-productive periods be-
tween the segments. Efforts to reach a higher standard of automation are con-
nected with the target of increased availability of machinery. of plant facilities 
and enhanced flexibility of personnel . Staff competence must be of a high order-
this is central to the successful implementation of JlT. The most important layout 
principle in manufacturing segmentation is so-called flow optimization. In order 
to achieve flow optimization, plant facilities with 
- small capacity cross-section 
- highly flexible production means 
are preferable (41. The company's marketing function may cause decisions 
necessitating provision of flexible machines and/or special equipment. The 
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adaptation to changing marketing tasks does not necessarily require completely 
new machinery with new functions but a variation of the plant size or utilization 
at equal costs per unit. 
- Synchronization between materials demands in the production process and pro-
curement activities: a production-synchronous supply system requires extremely 
high coordination between the internal sub-systems of manufacturers (or traders) 
and their suppliers. Demand estimation becomes much more important: interrup-
tions in the materials flow immediately cause breakdowns (,standstills') in the 
production process. (n addition to the aspect of materials quality or specification, 
the standard of delivery services provided by the supplier will be focused on: in 
extreme cases daily or even hour-by-hour deliveries are necessary. and the sup-
plier or forwarder must be able to manage this, and to make rapid adjustments to 
quantity to meet unforeseen changes in demand. In fact, JIT delivery means that 
the materials needed for manufacturing or supplying a product are made 
available 
- at the right working place in the customer's premises 
- at the right moment of demand 
- in the appropriate quality and quantity 
As Fig. 3 illustrates. the materials flow runs from supplier to customer. The infor-
mation flow nceded for coordination runs in the opposite direction from the 
customer to the supplier and comes into contact with the product flow at regular in-
tervals. In order to produce benefits in the supply chain (reduction of throughput 
times and supply times), not only a new design of existing information and handling 
procedures but fundamental changes in their structures arc necessary. Characteristics 
of these structures are 
- establishment of flow principles 
- self-controlled planning and disposition 
- on·line data processing in the logistical chain 
- linking of the planning and disposition systems installed at suppliers' and manu-
facturers' companies 
The provision of such inrormation as is necessary takes place on several planes, 
and may well do so concurrently . For example. there may well be 
- Primary/ policy communication-between end customer, and the producer's 
marketing function; and between the producer's procurement function and sup-
pliers' marketing functions 
- Internal communication-between the central policy decision units of the pro-
ducer or trader and the various operating units. defining the basic programmes 
- Tertiary/ operational communication-between the functionaries, each with the 
immediate predecessor in the chain. regarding day-to-day administration of the 
agreed processes and schedules of requirements 
1« " : 
Fig. ) . 
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logistical chain between customer, producer. trader and suppl ier. 
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Regarding the now of goods (venically upwards) through Fig. 3, it will also be 
noted that supply to the next level 'above' in the chain may be either direct from 
'production' or indirect, ex inventory. Flows of both goods and communication are 
at their maximum in terms of both number and complexity at the interface between 
'producer' and 'supplier'. The more companies in the lineal chain, the more com-
plex lhese relationships will tend to become. the further away from the end customer 
that interface is. A centralized control system with action-orientated data processing 
is illustrated by Fig. 4 which illustrates the major improvement in information con-
trol possible within the producer's domain, dt:rived from an lOP system. Clt:'ariy 
such a system is capable of direct integration with compatible systems in both 
customers' and suppliers' organizations. In practical terms, proponents of all such 
systems (whether company-discrete or fully integrated), will be or become aware of 
the need to streamline or edit data publications to avoid 'information paralysis'. 
Supplier 
Purchasing Receipt of PrOduClior\ Sub· 
department goods dep.lrtmcnt assernbly 
Construction \ !~ departml!nl Assemhly 
Production ~ scheduling Ccntralilcd dcpartmt!nl 
control with 
support of 
electronic 
dal<l 
~ 
proccssing 
Marketing ~ Quality 
department ~ control I I 
CuSlOm(!r 
------------
Dispatch 
department 
Fig. 4. Centralized control with action-orientatcd data proccssing. 
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Appendix II illustrates some of the inter·link options which, progressively. 
become feasible. 
The first step in both the development and evaluation of JIT. however. starts in 
the producer's internal area, with efforts to detect and eliminate waste or duplica-
tion of effort in areas of machining and assembly processing, transportation. 
materials handling, thus bringing down wastage or defect rates to an absolute 
minimum. These efforts have to be reinforced by instilling into the minds of all 
employees-through training programmes and internal campaigns-the general idea: 
"All work is waste unless it creates added value" (31. Therefore a basic concern of 
liT is that inventories hide mistakes and management deficiencies. Inventories 
usually allow an uninterrupted production, prompt delivery, compensation for 
troubles, unbalanced capacities, insufficient flexibility, scrap and lack of accuracy 
with respect to delivery abilities. So it becomes easy to accept the advice: 
"Reduce inventories, and you can easily identify the sources of errors. ,. 
Figure 5 shows diagrammatically how such a process can help to focus on points 
requiring attention. This is however not to suggest that the sole purpose of inventory 
reduction is as a contribution to problem identification! Reduction of inventory 
,,,. tg~lgr" a l ... ~r~f 
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Fig. S. How a reduction of noats or inventories can reveal actual problems (3}. 
410 U. Arnold and K.N. Bernard 
levels (or even elimination of certain categories) has dear cost~saving implications in 
its own right-not restricted to the 'operative' company. This will be discussed fur-
ther, later in this article. 
3. CHANGES IN COMPETITION AS A MAIN FACTOR 
STIMULATING JIT DISCUSSION 
The number of products available, in consumer as well as in industrial goods. is 
steadily increasing. Among the reasons for this are 
- changes in demand structure. Consumer demands are becoming continually more 
differentiated and individualized 
- convenience becomes more and more important as an influence on buying deci~ 
sions. Consumers are less willing to accept any practical purchasing difficulties or 
even time lags between cognition and fulfilment of their wishes. In the case of im-
pulse buying or fad products, immediate availability is the crucial competitive 
element 
- stronger international competition (especially in the textile. automobile. house-
hold appliances. food sectors). Producers try to achieve a profile not only 
through creating merely psychological distinctions or 'pseudo-innovations' but 
by actual differentiation of products 
- in saturated markets. especially in consumer goods markets. producers tend to 
employ the marketing instrument of price relatively aggressively and employ a 
variety of strategies designed to make a limited number of products attractive to a 
wide range of markets or segments 
- product life spans are decreasing rapidly. This forces producers to adopt more 
dynamic product policies. with consequences for both investment recovery and 
risk evaluation. as well as causing time and secrecy pressures in the introductory 
phases 
Porter [61 emphasizes that competitive advantage can be achieved either in the 
cost sector or by differentiation. The corresponding competitive strategies arc 
outlined in Fig. 6. 
Competiti .... e advantage through 
low COSts Qitferenllallon 
Domain of long ·term COSt leadership Differentiation 
competition goal 
Short · term Cost focus Different ia tion 
goal locus 
Fig. 6. Competitive strategies (from ref. 6). 
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Traditional strategies no longer seem to be totally adequate: they focus mainly on 
economies of scale in production and distribution under the premises of a long~run 
non-dynamic environment. This is the foundation of the classical economists' view 
of the state and tendency towards equilibrium. 
The market dilemma under conditions of increasing competition is obvious 
- the cost leadership strategy requires more potential for flexibility as market in-
duced changes in production occur more and more frequently, and potential price 
competition further increases pressure on margins 
- the strategy of differentiation per se requires greater potential for flexibility of 
production, distribution and service. This potential causes cost levels which 
can impede competitiveness, particularly under conditions of international 
competition 
The new information technologies, in combination with EDP-aided planning and 
disposition systems, automated control techniques, and automated production and 
transport systems, offer an opportunity to resolve the conflict between the goals of 
increased flexibility and economically sound cost levels. 
As previously mentioned, integrated EDP·information systems are in practice in~ 
tegral units of the JlT concept; they constitute one of Wildemann's three basic units . 
The JIT concept must be regarded as an important tool to improve competitive 
advantage. There can hardly be any doubt that better coordination of internal and 
external materials flows will achieve measurable cost savings and can simultaneously 
improve the delivery standards of producers and trading agents. Some of these 
economic effects should be analysed more deeplY. 
4. EFFECTS OF JIT-ORIENTATED MATERIALS MANAGEMENT 
4.1. Effects of the producer's choice of suppliers 
Implementation of JlT delivery needs coordination of material flows with respect 
to the actual requirements of the production process. The logistic chain between 
supplier and producer has to be adjusted to meet the demands at the various stages 
of production smoothly and precisely at the required intervals. The coordination 
and logistical efforts required will usually only be justified for goods with high usage 
value (A and B type materials). Normally. planning activities concentrate on about 
10-15'10 of the number of items handled. which. on the other hand. often add up to 
a value of 80070 of total materials costs. Some automobile producers, for instance, 
seem to give up their traditional purchasing strategy (employing several suppliers for 
one part; never use the full capacity of a single supplier) in favour of a strategy of 
'single sourcing' in order to reduce the amount of capital and energy spent on coor-
dination and logistics. Whilst this practice is often associated with adoption of JIT, 
the link is not a proven necessity. 
The central features with respect to the choice of materials dispositions best suited 
for JIT are 
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- repetitiveness of orders/production lots 
- precision and lead time estimations 
- variety in production 
- level of smoothness of production processes 
- structure of supplier market 
In addition, a number of other essential prerequisites for a successful JlT pro-
gramme, not specific to materials or their scheduling, may be identified 
- short lines of physical communication 
- control over the transportation function 
- high level of prominence and significance to the supplier. such that the customer's 
business will be accorded the priority necessary to insure against delays in delivery 
It will thus be noted that a complementarity exists between suppliers' and 
customers' interests. As noted earlier, Class A and B inventory items suggest 
themselves as being most appropriate for this treatment: conversely the customer 
and his/her requirements must be high on the significance scale to the supplier. 
The Japanese motor industry typifies the classic vision of JIT. where all the above 
criteria are met. but it is recognized that the ultimate facilitating elements are data 
processing integration and short links of physical communication (7). 
4.2. Cost effects of demand-synchronized delivery 
for the producer 
The profitability of a JlT supply system is determined by the cost effects for the 
companies involved. The rule applies that 
- JlT is profitable if all participants can reduce costs 
- JlT is profitable if only one participant can achieve a cost reduction 
- liT is always disadvantageous if higher overall costs result (unit costs increase for 
the supplier and are not at least balanced out by cost savings for the customer) 
Evidently. conflict may arise if optimal order sizes are given up in favour of 
demand-synchronized supply lots. 
I f purchasing dispositions are standardized to a degree where the fixed order costs 
are negligible, shifting to J IT supply will be profitable in most cases, because inven-
tories can be reduced to zero. This rests on the assumption that the quantities to be 
moved arc not beyond the capacity of the transport facilities. 
The data required for ordering are produced regularly and automatically as pro-
duction and task structures are planned; presuming that the necessary hardware has 
already been installed. Only the processes of data transmission and software 
development require additional expenditure. 
4.3. Cost effects for the supplier 
If a customer introduces J1T, the supplier may be able to reduce his series unit 
costs as well-for instance. if the adoption of J1T leads the customer to shift to 
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single sourcing and thus increase substantially the total amount purchased from one 
supplier alone. The supplier may then achieve internal scale effects, enter long-term 
contracts and/or achieve synergy effects through organizational coordination. How 
these potential centres for cost reduction on the supplier's side are perceived and 
how they affect price negotiations between supplier and customer is of particular in-
terest, and of varied significance, related to 
- supplier competitiveness and development of the experience curve 
- prior levels of competition and profitability 
- customer competitiveness and importance of price as a negotiating weapon 
More difficulties are encountered if a reduction of order lot size below the op-
timum point {(EOQ) leads to increased series unit costs for the supplier, owing to 
- smaller production lots adapted to the customer's lot size, or 
- higher inventory costs (if stocks are to compensate for variance between the sup-
plier's and customer's demand SChedules). 
The general impact of cost effects may be best illustrated by calculation of ex-
amples. Appendix I gives a generalized view of cost savings available to buyers, on 
the premises that 
- as order frequency increases the level of inventories held declines 
- as order frequency increases, the cost of ordering declines. 
On the supply side the computation is a little more complex. Consider for example 
the fixed series costs of a forge-in a medium size factory these might amount to 
DMI500 per batch or order, with an average order size of around 3(x)() units. As 
shown in Table 2 
- reductions in equipment costs and start up costs might be achieved by rationaliza-
tion of throughput, on optimal terms to supplier (EBQ) (net saving around 35%) 
- adoption of JIT to key customers (without such a rationalization) brings about a 
sharp rise in costs both for equipment and tooling, as the result of repeated tool 
changes, damage, wear and tear, and a general decrease in output due [0 in-
creased downtime. Administrative/distribution costs rise, and small order excess 
costs are incurred (net extra cost around 50070) 
- adoption of J1T. but with rationalization of throughput may produce a com-
promise (column 5) of a net extra cost of just 150'/0. The buyer in turn would 
require to balance this cost increase against his own internal savings (see for 
example, Appendix I) in order to evaluate the overall effect of the JIT proposal 
It can furthermore be hypothesized that series unit costs depend largely on lot 
size, as for example, is shown in Table 3 or graphically in Fig. 7. 
Reducing lot size to half its original size, twice (from 2000 to I(x)(); from 1000 to 
500 units) unit costs increase drastically from DM33.35 to DM49.63 (by 49'70). 
Assuming that a reduction of this size is realistic if a customer switches over to JIT, 
he wi 11 hardly be able to compensate cost increases of this scale. The additional costs 
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TABLE 2. 
Equipment costs 
Startup costs 
Tools costs 
Administration and 
distribution costs 
Add itional variable costs 
(eltlra charges) 
Total (0J0) 
Total costs (OM) 
TABLE 3. 
OM / unit 
150 
100 
Case 
Lor size 
Actual costs 
(rolal/ unit) 
\ 
\. 
Fixed share of costs (OJo) 
Actual Achieved by J IT without JlT with 
rationalization rationalization rationalization 
50 25 50 25 
25 15 25 15 
10 10 25 25 
15 15 20 20 
30 30 
100 65 150 115 
1500 975 2250 1725 
2 ) 4 5 
100 500 1000 2000 3000 
130.13 49.63 38.21 33.35 29.91 
50 
"------._--
lot size 
o 100 500 1000 2000 3000 
Fig. 7. 
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resulting from greater logistical efforts are not even considered! All in all, this 
would create an economic disadvantage. 
4.4. Overall cost effects in the logistical chain 
The question still has to be answered: "What is the overall effect on costs, taking 
into account the entire logistical chain?". This necessitates analysis. in detail. of 
suppliers' situations as well as of purchasing benefits. 
As the customer prescribes the exact amounts and times to be delivered (whether 
or not through an automated order system), the supplier will usually not be able to 
optimize the relative series lot size-unless the capacity and process technology of 
his/ her production are completely flexible and adapted to the customer's demand 
structure. Normally, only scheduling and lotsize/ production frequency decisions 
will be left to the supplier. The major cost factors in this decision calculus are 
- amount of fixed costs per lot 
- inventory costs 
To make more detailed conclusions (see again Appendix I), more speci fie 
knowledge of the individual case would be required. Synergy effects between dif-
ferent stages of production, cost effects for the supplier's own materials procure-
ment; inventory Facilities available would all have to be taken into consideration. 
4.5. logistical requirements 
The advantages of an 'on-line' inFormation link between supplier and customer 
can only be fully utilized if the physical now of materials and parts is also adequately 
organized. The storing and transport requirements for demand-synchronized 
delivery have to be fulfilled 
- with respect to internal company logistics 
- with respect to external logistics 
The task is characterized by a higher frequency (' more often ') and smaller 
volumes ('less') than traditional routines. Materials transport is no longer organized 
like tramp shipping; distribution Follows strict schedules like a regular service. The 
customer has to take in large numbers of vehicles, containers and inventory items 
each day: he has to see to it that the materials are conveyed to the points of demand 
by the requisite deadlines. In many cases, physical restrictions caused by remote 
plant location come into effecl (e.g. at VW in Wolfsburg, or UKAEA at Dounreay). 
The supplier is confronted with the problem of how to make best use of the 
transport facilities on their return journeys. This question acquires additional im· 
portance as the Frequency of delivery increases. Organizational changes indicating a 
tendency to externalize the transport funclion can already be noted 
- Customers may transfer all logistics including storage to independent enterprises. 
These are also responsible for assembly of orders and for the punctual delivery to 
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the points of demand (e.g. BMW/ Schenker; Bertelsmann/ Karstadt; Marks and 
Spencer/ SOC Transshield among many others). 
- Suppliers will have to decide whether it is economically advisable to maintain 
their own truck neet under the conditions outlined above. 
The transport industry and forwarding agencies have realized that their tasks have 
to be restructured (e.g. the concept of an area forwarding agent). However, there 
seems to be no clear idea as to how to integrate independent transport enterprises 
into the supplier's and customer's data communication network . The entire concept 
of 'middlemen·s' activities is changing, and assuming a more proactive role on the 
part of the customer. (This is discussed further below.) 
4.6. Effects on the financial structure 
To develop that potemial for flexibility in production and in the interaction with 
suppliers, substantial investments in hardware and software (programs and per· 
sonnel) are required. Hardware investments cover mainly 
- information and data processi ng technology 
- nexible production systems 
- automated product quality control 
- regulation and control techniques (automated ordering etc.) 
- transport and storing facilities 
This leads to a major change in the proportions of invested and circulating 
capital. According to Wildemann {4. p. 14J. it is better to hold and rund capacity in 
'invested capital' rather than in 'circulating capital'. This may require a reorganiza· 
lion of the balance~sheet structure-to increase the proportion of invested capital 
relative to the circulating capital in order to achieve low throughput time and high 
nexibility. 
Wildemann states that there is always a demand for exactly the products that are 
out of stock at the moment. Therefore it seems reasonable to install additional 
capacities so the requested articles can be produced at the time of demand and the 
time lag between demand emergence and delivery can be reduced, but it must be 
remembered that the extent of production capacity and of inventory required to 
meet any demand, instantaneously, in full, is literally infinite. Evaluation of prob· 
abilities is therefore a matter of essential prudence . 
The price to be paid for high nexibility is high capital investment-but expensive 
equipment may also lead to inflexibility. The term 'investment capital' is closely 
connected with the term ' fixed costs' and poses a classic problem in business theory. 
According to theory, capital-intensive enterprises are more sensitive to variation in 
capacity utilization . They become more vulnerable, more inertial and possibly even 
lethargic with respect to qualitative or quantitative changes in capacity, especially 
when a downturn is in prospect! 
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5. EFFECTS ON TRANSACTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
5.1. New tasks for the supplier 
The implementation of the JlT concept and realization of its benefits requires a 
perspicacious selection of suppliers in order to meet the goals of 
- zero-error quality 
- absolute reliability of delivery 
- market-adequate cost level 
It may be inevitable that the major buyer exerts pressure on the supplier's 
organizational structure whether deliberately or otherwise. This pressure might in-
volve prescription of a standardized data exchange system and adjustment of infor-
mation technologies or the transfer of functions previously performed by the 
customer to the supplier (e.g. quality control, acceptance procedures). These often 
turn out to be 'golden shackles'-factual or legal commitments like exclusive supply 
contracts, priorities of delivery, loans to the supplier, providing him with 
machinery, etc. The supplier thus inevitably loses some of his independence. (f the 
strategy is pushed still further towards a minimal number of stages of production 
within the purchaser's plant , the supplier will degenerate into an external workbench . 
It is stiLI not certain whether technology transferred from a large customer enables 
the supplier to participate actively in the customer's engineering and management 
progress, or to develop his / her skills for the benefit of his/ her own business in more 
general terms. 
5.2. Changes in strength of competition 
Over the years, concepts of purchasing efficiency, vendor appraisal, ad-
ministrative record keeping, cost control and inventory management have all tended 
to promote a reduction in the numbers of suppliers favoured by most companies. 
Examples can even be found of companies who deal with a single supplier and on a 
liT basis. 
Participation in these transactional relations will increasingly be influenced by in-
teractive coordination instead of market-induced competition. This also means that 
barriers to market entrance are erected; withdrawal from a market wil1 require con-
siderable time to break: up the inter-organizational ties. Competitive relations will be 
static and governed by pure power and redistribution struggles. Whether it is indeed 
advisable for suppliers to practice more cooperation, as is often recommended (par-
ticularly by politicians), or if this is just an attempt at faith healing, can only be 
speculated about at the moment. 
lIT suppliers tend to represent more than simply one element of a cooperative 
transaction relationship. Transaction theory (e.g. ref. 8) explains the relationship in 
terms of a 'reduction of transaction costs' ; this objective can be reached by so-called 
'internalization' of cost. On this view, suppliers are seen as part of one integrative 
system dominated by the buyer company. 
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The consequence of discussing the pressures of competition is to focus once again 
on the customer: what he requires and how his interests will or may be affected by 
fundamental changes in the supply side of the business. It must always be 
remembered that with the exception of the ultimate consumer, each organization or 
company has a dual role in the distribution or production chain-as customer and as 
supplier or marketer. 
Three particular marketing-related topics have been identified in this discussion 
- changes in the product line 
- channel relationships and management 
- identifiability of interest 
- Changes in the product line-whether by introduction of new items or deletion of 
existing items-may be impeded by the existence of the close and complex inter-
company relationships necessary for the successful functioning of a JIT system. 
Similarly, changes of supplier become more problematic-even when the pur-
poses of the 'producer/trader' are more than likely to be better served by the 
making of a change. It might thus seem paradoxical that companies, such as 
Ford, who have abandoned a 'make everything' policy. in favour of the flexibility 
of choice and freedom from capital tie-up that external sourcing can bring [91 
should be prepared to risk immobility by entering long term JIT relationships 
with key components suppliers, as suggested elsewhere IIO}. Indeed, it may nol be 
without significance that the Japanese motor industry (long regarded as the con-
cept's high priests) is now showing signs of abandoning or modifying its practice 
of JIT [7J, replacing it either by a freer association or by vertical corporate in-
tegration with the suppliers in parallel with the Mars/Horlicks model. The key 
decisions are thus likely to be related to the longevity expected from the relation-
ship and the relative sizes of the purchasing and supplying organizations. 
- Channel Relationships and Superiority. A process of vertical integration and sup· 
posed rationalization of channel outlets has been a key feature of the trading 
environment in the U.S.A., U.K. and Western Europe for over 30 years. The pro· 
cesses of evolution have been variously hampered or encouraged by legislation 
(c.g. the Robinson-Patman Act of Congress; the U.K. Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act 19.56). Despite the various attempts to restrain the development of 
monopolies, there has been a seemingly inexorable drift towards concentration of 
both industrial manufacturing power and commercial trading activity into pro-
gressively fewer sets of hands. 
The consequences have been dramatic. Taking the retail trades as an example, 
not only has there been a massive reduction in the number of businesses trading 
[L L), but in greater than inverse proportion the power of the multiple traders 
has been perceived to increase. It is well documented that this shift in channel 
power has arisen in part from changes in merchandising policy, and in part from 
pricing strategies. The demands made upon their suppliers by these multiples arc 
thus directLy analogous to those of the 'producers' discussed above. Stockless 
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distribution; reduction of lines offered. rationalization of suppliers have all been 
seen; but there have recently been symptoms of unease in the retailers' camps, as 
they now compete with organizations of equivalent strength, and seek for bases 
of differentiation [121. 
The consequences of such concentration (as has also been parallelled in the 
motor industry) have been felt far beyond the retailers' premises. Manufacturers 
of prospective new products face severely restricted opportunities: Silverman (13) 
estimated that it was, in practice, essential for a new food product to be adopted 
by at least one of the handful of major retail food groups in the U.K. if it was to 
stand any realistic chance of survival, let alone achieve long-term successful 
penetration of the market. On the assumption that effective penetration did take 
place, and the product was successful enough to become a 'best seller' much ex-
perience suggests that the original supplier would have progressively less in-
fluence over the subsequent presentation and marketing of the product to the 
consuming public, as retailers and other distributors seek to use the successful 
brands as a bargaining counter. 
Investigation of the marketing of 'healthy food' products by Kelly [141 has 
already suggested that in reality the initial demand or market for this putative seg-
ment was not identified by manufacturers nor pushed for by consumers but was 
created by a small number of retailers who could be seen as 
- dictating (as customer) to the manufacturers what they required or 
- pressuring the consumer, by manipulating shelf space, into buying what was 
offered for sale. 
This is but one example of the extent to which channel power can be seen to 
work. (potentially at least) against at least one group of customers' wishes and 
desires. and which can thus be seen as encouraging the more strident elements of 
the consumerist lobby, which frequently appears to portray marketers as 
manipulative and unscrupulous. 
Even in situations of less overt influence on consumer choice, pressures in-
duced by producers' or traders' insistence on a JlT purchasing strategy may have 
dire consequences for individual suppliers, especially where they lack size or 
'muscle' compared with their customer. Schreffler [7] notes that even although 
such suppliers may not be forced out of business, there is no guarantee that they 
will share in the overall or 'net' benefit subsumed by the producer or dominant 
partner in a JlT programme. Such suppliers not infrequently find that {hey are 
obliged to supply on a JIT basis but lack the purchasing Significance to insist thaI 
their suppliers reciprocate: they thus find themselves obliged to hold inventory on 
behalf of their customers. and to facilitate their own production operations, 
without being able to negotiate an adequate price adjustment. 
In this 'worst of both worlds' situation the alternatives are stark, and fre-
quently unpalatable 
- accept loss of effective profit and attempt to diversify to other markets-rarely 
simple or risk-free 
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- cease supplying-and perhaps risk liquidation 
- admit to being a captive supplier and submerge identity-possibly to the extent 
of a corporate takeover 
Such a choice is not fantasy-as many erstwhile suppliers to Marks and 
Spencer. for one, have found-except that in that case the third option was not 
available. 
- Identifiability of interest is arguably the greatest problem of all. Whilst it is 
generally accepted that each company has the prerogative to define its own mis-
sion and strategic plans, that is not synonymous with any suggestion of posses-
sion of the right to dictate choice to its customers. 
In the ultimate, the 'integrated system' approach to supply and marketing may 
be seen to imply the monopolistic right of the buyer to determine his suppliers' 
policies. Abuse of purchasing power-especially in an oligopolistic market, or as 
in the retail trades faced with diminishing numbers of competitors-leads to a 
significant reduction in the degree of choice available to the purchasing public. At 
the fringes this may not represent any loss of economic utility. but cumulative 
reduction can only lead to the Safeway (U .S.) situation of diminishing market ap· 
peal and diminishing profits, coupled with increased market opportunities for 
ncw, entrepreneurial competitors [121. 
Such a sequence might run as follows: 
Competitive pressure 
- --> 
- --> 
- - -> 
- - - :> 
- - -> 
- - -> 
Concentration of product lines 
Concentration of suppliers 
Purchasing pressure on trading terms 
JIT 
Restriction of suppliers and of product choice 
Restriction of customer attractiveness 
At the end of the day, the trader must ask himself whether his utility to his 
customer depends entirely or principally on price, or whether non-price variables 
can assume significant competitive roles in differentiating (if not actually 
rragmenling) the markel (15J. 
6. JIT: SAVIOUR OR CURSE? 
It is probably true to say that practised in isolation, without full appreciation of 
its pitfalls and implications. any business theory is likely to come to grief. This 
would certainly appear to be the case with the J IT concept. I f carried to extremes, if 
insisted upon by customers without the active cooperation of suppliers, it is prob-
able that not only would the adoption of JlT prove to be unworkable. but also. in 
the long run, it would induce an inflexibility which could be detrimental (if not fatal) 
to customer and supplier alike-whether the supplier be a raw materials organiza-
tion or a consumer products manufacturer. 
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On the other hand, to treat JlT as if it represents an undesirable, alien intrusion 
into the world of management decision making is equally unrealistic: one cannot 
turn the clock back, nor can one deny the benefits or JlT -under certain eir· 
cumstances. The optimum course to pursue is therefore to focus on the strengths of 
JlT and to circumvent its weaknesses, or the circumstances where it is inappro-
priate. Like the computer, the JlT concept has already round its way across the 
psychological divide between 'remote' manuracturing industry and the 'immediate' 
arena of trade and commerce. As with the computer, we have to learn the fallibilities 
and the opportunities or the concepl. These may perhaps best be grouped under 
three headings: 
- the environment 
- applications, or objectives 
- consequences 
becoming somewhat more significant, and contentious, in turn. 
6.1. The environment 
It is accepted without question that the commercial world of the late 20th century 
is inherently more competitive and more dynamic than any other preceding era: thus 
it is not surprising nor inappropriate ror commercial organizations to do all in their 
power to protect their present positions and to secure rurther competitive advantage. 
Successive cyclical swings in business, of both long- and shorHcrm types, have 
taught corporations that, as well as entrepreneurial nair, future success depends 
upon strategic foresight and achievement of present cost-efficiency. The importance 
attached to inventory management has long been appreciated, but it is only the rapid 
diffusion of computer application of the past 15-20 years that has opened up the 
true scope of this facet of business, and hence shown the benefits (in dramatically 
quantifiable terms) to be derived from JlT. 
Before 1970, although enlightened companies appreciated the concepts linking 
profitability to shelf space, or floor area to sales exposures, few had the physical 
resources of, for example, Unilever or Allied Suppliers to carry out the mathe-
matical analyses involved. Even such large organizations could not, at that time. 
contemplate monitoring such detail on a regular, ongoing basis (16). 
The rapid development of computer technology, and the widespread diffusion of 
EPOS systems has not just produced data, it has encouraged businesses to explore 
and exploit new opportunities. 
6.2. Applications and objectives 
In the ultimate, the aim or all inventory is to facilitate the provision of a service. 
and of successful competition the provision or the highest level among suppliers . 
Thus the concept or 'level of service' comes to assume practical significance, with 
the recognition that there is an inverse (although non-linear) relationship between 
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inventory levels and the ability to satisfy customers. The consequent need (Q classify 
inventory into degrees of significance thus spawned not only the relatively simple 
concepts of ABC analysis and JlT, but also focused management attention on the 
much more complex means of measuring progress towards implementation of these 
ideals. 
6.3. Consequences 
Although there has been for some lime a general recognition of the benefits to be 
derived from a strict control of inventories, and an appreciation of the notional ad-
vantages offered by JlT, widespread adoption of the latter and lukewarm practice of 
the former has been attributed to a number of practical hurdles in many companies. 
Some of these barriers are technological in origin, for example 
- lack of data or data processing expertise 
- logistical impediments, like erratic or interruptable supplies or usage patterns 
- wide choice of suppliers necessitating continual changes in point of purchase 
Some of the reasons advanced amount to little more than inertia or internal 
empire-building, like unwillingness to enter into long-term commitments to sup-
pliers because that might be interpreted as facilitating a reduction in the effon or 
resources required for the procurement function, or as implying a policy of product 
stability. 
Perhaps the most difficult argument against liT to answer is that companies' 
policies should be capable of change at the direction of companies themselves, and 
not be held hostage to long-term supply commitments. Competitive success appears 
to depend at least as much on enrrepreneurial flair a la Peters and Waterman, as it 
does upon detailed strategic analysis and planning [17). 
J IT is seen as encouraging stability not only of supplier but of product, whereas 
competitive strategies are perceived as requiring freedom of manoeuvre. Commer-
cial s.uccess might logically be maximised if these two apparently con flicting philo-
sophies could be managed in combination. Such a formula would entail 
- identification of the right product line 
- effective sourcing 
..:. establishment of close control over the vendor and the supply contract 
in other words marketing oriented purchasing. 
The adoption of the J IT concept must therefore be based upon recognition of two 
essential points: 
- JlT is a facilitating concept and not the ultimate goal of the firm. If market or en-
vironmental conditions alter, the firm must be prepared for reappraisal of its 
supply systems as well as of the products which it acquires and supplies. 
- J IT is simply one management tool among others, but one which has entailed a 
great deal of adjustment among suppliers. and which has been a major element in 
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the perceived balance of control in the management of distribution channels. 
Even if a JIT proposal is considered and then declined, or if a change in the 
product mix eventually precludes the future expansion of the JIT principle, the 
concept cannot be ·unlearned' nor are the currently dominant members of the 
channels likely, voluntarily, to yield control of their businesses to others. 
The third consequence of the JIT "fashion' has been not only the evolution of 
specialist logistical sub-contractors. but a major revolution in the role of the whole-
saler~s function which traditionally was to act primarily-albeit not exclusively-as 
a distributor for the manufacturer's wares. In West Germany we now have the situa-
tion where having passed through a phase of non-acceptability for reasons of profit 
margin maximization. wholesalers find themselves back in favour with certain of the 
retail majors but in a different light-as acquisitors, for the retailers' benefit [8]. 
This seemingly simple-though logical and apparently totally marketing oriented 
-transformation has not only required a fundamental reappraisal of commercial 
purchasing strategies, it has also tended to highlight alternative schemes of integra-
tion-e.g. KaufhoflHertie and Metro, and to shift into the area of corporate 
strategy decisions on the breadth of inventory range to be carried across the corpora-
tion as a whole. It remains to be seen whether by acquiring their own 'wholesaler', 
the retailers have gained an overall , as opposed to a merely segmental, advantage 
over other traders. 
In the U.K .• the general trend of the past 20 years shows little real change, and 
certainly not at the instigation of retailers. Major store groups and mail order houses 
continue to emphasise their direct purchases from manufacturers-to the ex.tent of 
ex.panding their own overseas procurement operations. In effect (irrespective of ter-
minology) they regard themselves as sole suppliers to their own outlets. and thus 
seek to retain overt and direct control over the entire distribution channel. The onus 
to supply on a liT basis still exists but with the balance often being seen as dictated 
by the retailer rather than negotiated to the satisfaction of all parties. The concept of 
wholesaler as acquisitor and consolidator of supplies has apparently yet to reach its 
full potential, despite the existence of numerous contract warehousing and distribu-
tion specialists. Such specialists require to become more than reactive logistical 
contractors: there is a potential role for them as proactive sourcers and supply con-
solidators-to the benefit of retail majors and 0 f the smaller, perhaps shorter term 
suppliers who at present are unable to meet the demands of the dominant retailers. 
7. WHO WAGS?-THE TAIL OR THE DOG? 
It is clearly beyond the scope of this article to prescribe formulae for individual 
traders or producers to follow . What should be clear however is that not only has the 
business world irrevocably changed, but that the changes are fundamental, complex 
and organic-not just involving adjustments of scale. 
The fact that concepts such as marketing are seen to pervade the manufacturing 
and administration of companies is not accidental: in a similar manner the concepts 
of administration and "good' management must have some impact upon the function 
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of marketing. without altering its basic concept. J IT as a concept is simple. but as 
discussed aboye, its practice is tess so, and in turn raises wider issues of procurement 
policy. and hence of product policy and marketing strategy. 
In the final analysis, the decision on whether or not to insist that suppliers adopt a 
J IT philosophy has to be taken in the full context of the business: the adyantage to 
be gained, the administratiye disciplines to be imposed, the distributive and ac· 
quisitive channel options and consequences which exist. Undoubtedly JlT offers 
many advantages. As with all aspects of business these have to be translated into 
valuable opportunities if they are to provide any benefit. At the very least, however, 
the evaluation of a JIT option (whether it is adopted) cannot be other than benefidal 
to the company. in that it forces the company to face and evaluate the validity of 
current policies and practices, and to be aware of the real costs of inventories. The 
decision on whether those policies should be changed rests however on the long· and 
short·term corporate benefits to be gained from a set of strategic decisions-and not 
just on the short·term administrative convenience to be acquired. 
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APPENDIX I BUYER'S COST REVISION SITUATION WHEN 
IMPLEMENTING JIT PROCUREMENT 
This example is driven by specified or assumed increases in order frequency (h). 
and actual or presumed corresponding reductions in fixed order costs (e) . 
Items 2 3 n 
Planning time T 
(weeks) 16 16 16 · .. 16 
TOlal need x 
(units) 3200 3200 3200 · . . 3200 
Fixed order costs c 
(OM / order) 640 160 40 · .. 10/ 49 
Unit stock-keeping cOSts I 
(OM / unit per week) 0 . 10 0 . 10 0 . 10 · .. 0 . 10 
Opt imal order volume· q 
(unil s) (EOQ) 1600 800 400 20017 
Order frequency h 2 4 8 112 
Order COSts 
Kn"" c ' h 1280 640 320 · . , 22.86 
Total stock· keeping costs 
K,= qI 2 ·/ · T 1280 640 320 · . . 22 .86 
Total COSt situation 
Jo.';;Ku+K I. 1560 1280 640 45.72 
Cost savings KU + 1280 + 1920 + 2514. 28 
/ . T 
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Potential for Potent ial lor 
rationalization mark.eting 
Potential l or 
success 
Poten tial lor cooperation 
Potentia ls for success of integrated materials flow/ commodity flow systems. 
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APPENDIX II 
cir~N slage: lr~anilation al links bel ween lechnically unconnected dala ·processing s ystem ~ 
Second stage: Integralion of unconnected systems through tools (PC. Query. Networks) 
~f I r I~lL~ 
( -, 
CAD / CAM 
PPS 
( rE.'"J,-.Lj 
PC 
Third stage: Data transfer between tWO system~ 
Founh stage ; D::ua base shared by twO syslems 
shared 
data base 
PPS 
Fifth stage: User-user-relation through integrated programs 
Degrees and options for integration 
t • 
CA D/ CAM 
'"-PPS.-I 
, 
shared 
dat3 base 
(@ (=, 
PPS 
in: A. W. Schcer. SlraleR;e :.ur Enlw;cklunR tines CIM-Kon:.eptes. Springer. Berlin. 1987. p . 9. 
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C I M 
CAD/ CAM PPS 
SPECIFICATION 
DECISIONS 
QUANTITY 
CAD C DECISIONS 
SCHEDULING I 
CAPACITY DECIS IONS 
CAP A 
ORDER ING 
CAM Q I PRODUCTION 
CONTROL 
ElcmenlS of e lM . From A . W. Scheer, Slfall!Xie zur El1lwil:kJunx e;nes C IM· KonU!'les, 
Springer. Serlin, 1987, p. 15. 
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Just-In-Time (Juste;\ Temps): Quelques questions de marketing 
qui ont btb soulevbes par un concept popuiaire dans la produc-
tion et la distribution 
RESUME 
La liuerature des (rente dernieres annees contient de nombreuses contributions 
consacrees a I'amelioration de I'efficacite des entreprises: un des secteurs clefs 
auxque1s I'on s'est adresse est ce1ui des depenses, ce qui a attire I'anemion, entre 
autres, sur les couts de stocks. II apparait frequemment que Ie developpement d'un 
systeme de logistique capable d'eliminer au de reduire considerablement les stocks, 
est non seulement considere comme universellement praticabte. rna is ipso facto, 
souhaitable. Cependant, exaClement com me de nombreuses cornpagnies ne semblent 
pas apprecier la portee pour I'entreprise d'une orientation vers Ie marketing, "Just 
in Time" semble etre generalement considere en lant que concept ou pratique qui oe 
porte Que sur des secteurs limites des affaires de la societe. 
Dans eet article, les auteurs essaycnt de creer une conscience de deux secteurs clef: 
les conditions prealables necessaires a l'expioitation d'un programme J IT, et les can· 
sequences qui resultent d'une telle decision. Le pOfentiel 'interne' d'economies cst 
discute, el ceci est complete par la consideration de certains effets potentie1s sur la 
gamme de produits et les fa~ons scion lesquelles Ie 'marketing mix' peut etre affecte. 
Des experiences reccntes dans Ie devcloppcmcnt de bases logistiqucs en Grande 
Bretagnc et en Allcmagne Federale sont discutees en parallele aux pratiqucs 
courantes au Japon, 
Les auteurs nc prctcndent pas avoir formule un scenario dcfinitif, mais ils prapo-
sent leurs points de vue en tant que base de deliberation par tcs administratcurs, tout 
en ctant convaincus que la decision d'exploiter un programme JIT devrait joucr un 
role subalterne au plan Slrategique de I'entrcprise, plutet que de dominer Ie pro-
cessus de la planification. 
Just-in-Time: Marketing-Probleme eines popuiaren Produktions-
und Distributionskonzepts 
ABRISS 
In der Litcralur der Ictzten 30 Jahre erscheinen immer wieder Beitr!ige zur 
Verbesserung der Unternehmenseffizienz, in denen natUrlich Fragen der Kosten, 
darunler auch der Lagerkostcn, besondere Bcachtung finden. Dabei wird oft der 
Eindruck erweckt, dan die Entwicklung von Logistiksystemen, die Lager unnOtig 
mach en oder zumindest scharf reduzieren. nicht nur universell durchfUhrbar 
sondcrn auch ipso facto erstrebenswert sci. Andcrcrseits scheint "Just-in-Time" 
(JlT) generell als ein Bcgriff betrachtet zu werden, der nur fUr beschr!1nkte 
Unternehmensbereiche Bedeutung hat. 
In dieser Arbeit versuchen die Verfasser, Aufmerksamkeit auf zwei Kernfragen zu 
lenken: die notwendigen Vorbcdingungen fUr die EinfUhrung eines J1T-Programms 
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und die sich daraus ergebenden Folgen. Die Moglichkeiten der "internen" 
Kastenersparnis werden besprochen. und es werden weiterhin die moglichen 
Auswirkungen auf die Produktpalene und den Marketing.Mix untersucht. Er· 
fahrungen mit der Entwicklung von Logistik·Basen in GroObritannien und der 
Bundesrepublik werden mit japanischen Praktiken verglichen. 
Die Verfasser behaupten nicht. ein definitives Szenario entwickelt zu haben. 
sondern sie betrachten ihre Gedanken als eine Basis hir die Oberlegungen von 
Managern-in der Oberzeugung, daO die Entscheidung, ein JlT -Programm ein-
zufUhren, der strategischen Unternehmensplanung untergeordnet werden muO 
anstatt den PlanungsprozeO zu dominieren. 
Just-In-Time (a tiempo): algunos problemas de marketing plan-
teados por un concepto popular en producci6n y distribuci6n 
RESUMEN 
Tado 10 publicado en los ultimos 30 alios esta diseminado a prop6sito can con-
tribuciones dedicadas a la mejora de la eficiencia corporativa: una de las areas prin-
cipales que han sido tratadas es la referente a costos. la cual ha centrad a la atenci6n. 
inter alia, los costas de inventario. Freeuentemente parcee que el desarrollo de un 
sistema logistico. el cual puede climinar 0 reducir significativamcnte el inventario, 
no s610 es asumido como posiblc universalmente sino tam bien dcseable ipso facto. 
Sin embargo muchas corporaciones 1a rnayoria de las veces parecen no apreciar 
las implicaciones corporalivas de una oricntaci6n de marketing. de igual rorma 
A Ticmpo pareee Que cs visto normalrnente como un conccplo 0 como una practica 
que solo tiene rclevancia en areas limitadas de los negocios de una compania. 
En este articulo. los autares intcman crear concicncia de dos areas principales: los 
prerequisitos escnciales para la aplicaci6n de un program a A Tiempo y las conse-
cuencias que resultan de tal decision. El potencial de ahorro del coste 'interino' es 
desarrollado y complementado por la consideracion de alguno de los efectos pot en-
ciales en la garna de productos y las form as en las que la mezcla de marketing puede 
ser afectada. Se explican expcriencias recientes sabre el desarrollo de bases logisticas 
en el Reino Unido y en la Republica Federal Alcrnana, de rorrna paralela con las 
practicas actualcs en Japon. Los autores no pretenden haber formulado un 
escenario definitivo aunque orrecen sus ideas como una base para ser deliberadas 
por los directivos en la creenda de Que la decision de aplicar un programa A Tiempo 
deberia estar subordinada al plan estrategico corporativo mas que dominar el pro-
ceso de plani ricacion. 
